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公司治理結構»P治理機制研究¡G基於ª÷¿Ä危機¡BªÑ權分置改²的µø¨¤ 內容簡介 本書實ÃÒ研究了ª÷¿Ä危機期¶¡公司治理機制對公司業績的影ÅT¡BªÑ權分置改²前後°ª管更替後公司業績的改善情況¡BªÑ權分置改²引°_的«D流³qªÑ比例改ÅÜ和控ªÑªÑ東持ªÑ比例ÅÜ化對公司現ª÷ªÑ利支付的影ÅT¡C 本書同時探究了中國上市公司現ª÷ªÑ利支付相Ãö的侵占問ÃD¡A具Åé研究了ªÑ權分置改²前後«D流³q比例的改ÅÜ¡B控ªÑªÑ東持ªÑ比例的改ÅÜ»P公司現ª÷ªÑ利支付ÅÜ化的Ãö係¡C本書研究ªí明¡A在中國¡A由於對中小ªÑ東保Å@ÁÙ不¨¬¡A加上¶°中的所有權結構¡A控ªÑªÑ東的動機«D常«n¡CªÑ權分置改²在一定程度上使控ªÑªÑ東»P中小ªÑ東的利益協½Õ一P¡A但是只n控ªÑªÑ東有動機持有充¨¬的ªÑ份以¹F到他們控制公司的目的¡A控ªÑªÑ東»P中小ªÑ東之¶¡的利益½Ä突就不會完全消°£¡C書中以理½×結合實»Ú¡A可Ū性強¡C
¥Ø¿ý 1-Introduction / 1 1-1 Motivations for the study / 1 1-1-1 Agency conflicts in corporations / 1 1-1-2 Corporate governance devices / 3 1-1-3 Agency conflicts and corporate governance structures in China / 6 1-2 Objectives of the study / 11 1-3 Methodology / 14 1-4 Organization of the book / 16 2-Literature review of corporate governance in China / 17 2-1 Ownership structure / 17 2-2 Board of directors / 20 2-3 CEO duality, CEO compensation, and CEO turnover / 21 2-4 External governance mechanisms / 24 2-4-1 Takeover market / 24 2-4-2 Product market competition / 25 2-4-3 Legal infrastructure / 25 2-4-4 Bank monitoring / 26 2-5 Summary of the literature review and research questions / 27 3-Corporate governance and firm value during the global financial crisis: Evidence from China / 29 3-1 Introduction / 29 3-2 Hypotheses / 33 3-3 Sample selection and data / 37 3-4 Empirical analyses / 43 3-4-1 Univariate analyses / 43 3-4-2 Regression results / 44 3-5 Additional tests / 50 3-5-1 Differing definitions of financial crisis periods / 50 3-5-2 Deletion of outliers / 53 3-5-3 Pre¡Ãcrisis period results / 54 3-6 Conclusions / 57 4-Long¡Ãterm stock performance following top executive turnover: Evidence from China / 60 4-1 Introduction / 60 4-2 Hypotheses / 64 4-3 Sample selection and data / 67 4-3-1 Sample selection / 67 4-3-2 Measure of turnover¡Ãrelated stock performance change / 71 4-4 Empirical results / 73 4-4-1 Stock performance following CEO turnover / 73 4-4-2 Cross¡Ãsectional determinants of turnover¡Ãrelated change in stock performance / 77 4-5 Conclusions / 81 5-Controlling shareholder, split¡Ãshare structure reform and cash dividend payments in China / 83 5-1 Introduction / 83 5-2 Hypotheses / 86 5-3 Sample selection and data / 89 5-3-1 Sample selection / 89 5-3-2 Variables / 90 5-3-3 Data description / 92 5-4 Empirical results / 95 5-5 Absolute levels of cash dividends, NPTS, and ownership concentration / 101 5-6 Conclusion / 104 6-Conclusion and implications / 106 References / 109 Appendix / 133
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